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This paper explores how international money markets reflected credit and liquidity risks during the 
global financial crisis.  After matching the currency denomination, we investigate how the Tokyo 
Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) was synchronized with the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
denominated in the US dollar and the Japanese yen.  Regardless of the currency denomination, 
TIBOR was highly synchronized with LIBOR in tranquil periods.  However, the interbank rates 
showed substantial deviations in turbulent periods.  We find remarkable asymmetric responses in 
reflecting market-specific and currency-specific risks during the crisis.  The regression results 
suggest that counter-party credit risk increased the difference across the markets, while liquidity risk 
caused the difference across the currency denominations.    They also support the view that a shortage 
of US dollar as liquidity distorted the international money markets during the crisis.  We find that 
coordinated central bank liquidity provisions were useful in reducing liquidity risk in the US dollar 
transactions.  But  their  effectiveness  was asymmetric across the markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In a well-integrated market, assets with the same risk characteristics would yield identical 
expected returns. Controlling regulatory treatments, the yield spreads among fixed-income assets 
denominated in the same currency should be equalized in normal times.  However, reflecting risk 
characteristics, the spreads may show substantial differences in crisis periods.  In this paper, we 
explore how the Tokyo and London money markets reflected credit and liquidity risks during the 
global financial crisis in 2007-2009.    After matching the currency denomination, we investigate how 
the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) was synchronized with the London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) denominated in the United States (US) dollar and the Japanese yen. 
LIBOR, the world's most widely used benchmark for short-term interest rates, is calculated 
for 10 currencies including the US dollar and the Japanese yen.  To the extent that the Japanese 
market segment is highly integrated with the world, TIBOR would show synchronization with LIBOR.   
However, as risk characteristics vary substantially, TIBOR may not be synchronized with LIBOR in 
crisis periods.  In particular, it is not clear how well the synchronization with LIBOR persists when 
economies are under serious financial crisis. 
    The following analysis investigates to what extent TIBOR was synchronized with LIBOR in 
2007-2009.  To calculate the synchronization, dollar-denominated TIBOR (that is, Eurodollar 
TIBOR) is matched with dollar-denominated LIBOR (that is, Eurodollar LIBOR).    Yen-denominated 
TIBOR (that is, Euroyen TIBOR) is also matched with yen-denominated LIBOR (that is, Euroyen 
LIBOR).    The matches allow a comparison of their returns without exchange rate risk.    The sample 
period of the analysis is noteworthy because it includes the periods before and after the global 
financial crisis.  Regardless of the currency denomination, the Tokyo market was highly 
synchronized with the London market before the crisis broke out.  However, during the global 
financial crisis, the interbank offered rates showed substantial deviations even denominated in the 
same currency.  More interestingly, they show remarkable asymmetric responses reflecting regional 
risk premiums.    3 
During the global financial crisis, the credit quality of European and US banks deteriorated 
substantially, but that of Japanese banks did not.  We find that risk premiums raised LIBOR more 
than TIBOR when denominated in the Japanese yen but increased TIBOR more than LIBOR in 
dollar-denominated markets.  The asymmetric impacts in the dollar-denominated and 
yen-denominated markets had a “home bias” feature reflecting different risk premiums under the 
liquidity crisis.  Our regression results show that credit risk increased the difference across the 
markets, while liquidity risk caused the difference across the currency denominations.  They also 
support the view that a shortage of US dollar as liquidity distorted the international money markets 
during the global financial crisis. 
Several studies have explored the degree of integration in world money markets in normal 
times and in crisis periods.    Exploring the London and New York interbank markets, Bartolini, Prati, 
and Hilton (2007) showed that the two markets were highly integrated in the period 2002--2004.  
McAndews (2008), on the other hand, found that LIBOR was significantly higher than the US rates at 
times of market distress beginning in August 2007.  Baba and Packer (2009a,b) investigated 
dislocations in the foreign exchange swap market between the US dollar and three major European 
currencies under the global financial crisis and found that deviations from covered interest parity were 
negatively associated with the creditworthiness of European and US financial institutions.
1  In 
contrast, Michaud and Upper (2008) showed that the cross-sectional dispersion of the premiums was 
largely independent of banks’ credit risk and was mainly driven by factors related to the funding 
liquidity under the global crisis.  Castiglionesi, Feriozzi, and Lorenzoni (2009) proposed that 
integration helps to reallocate liquidity when different countries are hit by uncorrelated shocks but 
leads to larger spikes in interest rates on the interbank market when an aggregate liquidity shock hits. 
As for the integration between the London and Tokyo interbank markets, numerous studies 
investigated a source of upward deviations of TIBOR from LIBOR in the late 1990s (see, among 
                                                  
1  See also Genberg, Hui, Wong and Chung (2009) and Grioli and Ranaldo (2010) for their recent 
contribution to the same topc.    4 
others, Hanajiri [1999], Batten and Covrig [2004], Covrig, Low, and Melvin [2004], Ito and Harada 
[2004], Peek and Rosengren [2001]).  Galpin, Resnick, and Shoesmith (2009), using daily LIBOR, 
SIBOR (Singapore Interbank Offered Rate), and TIBOR, found a strong positive relationship between 
pairs of risk premiums.  Analyzing the effects of the global financial crisis, Taylor and Williams 
(2009) showed how risk premiums of US-dollar-denominated LIBOR were correlated with those of 
yen-denominated TIBOR.  But there are very few studies that explored the degree of integration 
between the Tokyo and London money markets during the global financial crisis. 
The following analysis confirms part of the findings in previous studies.  However, unlike 
previous studies, this analysis investigates how the global financial crisis affected risk premiums in 
Tokyo money market in 2007-2009.  In the late 1990s, the Japanese banking crisis seriously 
damaged Japanese financial sectors.  Regardless of the currency denomination, TIBOR therefore 
showed substantial upward deviations from LIBOR, reflecting increased regional risk premiums.  
However, we find that the global financial crisis had asymmetric impacts on risk premiums of the 
Tokyo interbank rates between the US-dollar-denominated and yen-denominated rates.  This 
suggests the importance of distinguishing not only between credit risk and liquidity risk but also 
between liquidity risks denominated in different currencies.  As in literature, we find that 
coordinated central bank liquidity provisions were useful in reducing liquidity risk in the US dollar 
transactions.
2    However, their effectiveness was asymmetric across the markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the interbank 
offered rates used in this paper.  Section 3 investigates the degree that TIBOR has been integrated 
with LIBIOR throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.    After exploring a simple model of our analysis in 
Section 4, Section 5 explains how to measure counter-party credit risk and liquidity risk.  After 
explaining a basic framework of our econometric tests in Section 6, Sections 7 and 8 report the results 
of our regressions.    Section 9 extends our analysis by using the interbank rates that have shorter and 
                                                  
2 For  example,  Goldberg, Grittini, Miu, and Rose (2009) showed the contribution of foreign exchange 
swap lines among central banks to reducing dollar funding pressures and limiting stresses in money 
markets.    5 
longer terms-to-maturity.    Section 10 concludes and refers to the implications. 
 
2.    The Interbank Offered Rates 
    In the following analysis, we use the daily offer rates for TIBOR and LIBOR.    This section 
briefly describes the data of these interbank offered rates used in the analyses.   
 
London.  LIBOR is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which banks borrow 
unsecured funds from other banks in the London wholesale money market (or interbank market).    As 
the world's most widely used benchmark for short-term interest rates, LIBOR is the rate at which the 
world's most preferred borrowers are able to borrow money.  It is also the rate upon which rates for 
less preferred borrowers are based.   
LIBOR is calculated by Thomson Reuters and published by the British Bankers' Association 
after 11:00 a.m. each day (Greenwich mean time).    It is a trimmed average of interbank deposit rates 
offered by designated contributor banks, for maturities ranging from overnight to 1 year. Each 
currency panel comprises 8, 12, or 16 contributor banks, and the reported interest is the mean of the 
middle values (the interquartile mean).
3  The rates are a benchmark rather than a tradable rate; the 
actual rate at which banks lend to one another varies throughout the day. 
LIBOR is calculated for 10 currencies: the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish krone, 
euro, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Pound sterling, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, and US dollar.  
The following analysis uses LIBOR denominated either in the US dollar or the Japanese yen. Because 
the US dollar traded on the offshore market is referred to as the "Eurodollar” and the Japanese Yen 
traded on the offshore market is referred to as the "Euroyen," we refer to LIBOR denominated in the 
US dollar as “Eurodollar LIBOR” and LIBOR in the Japanese yen as “Euroyen LIBOR.”      The daily 
                                                  
3  In 2009, reference banks for the US dollar were Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd, Barclays Bank, 
Citibank NA, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mizuho Corporate Bank, 
Norinchukin Bank, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Société Générale, UBS AG, and 
WestLB AG. Those in the Japanese yen are almost the same. But they include Mizuho Bank and Sumitomo Mitsui instead of 
Credit Suisse and Royal Bank of Canada.      6 
data for the London analyses are downloaded from Datastream. 
 
Tokyo.  The Japan offshore market is a relatively unregulated market that was established in 
December 1986 to further liberalize and internationalize Japanese financial markets.  The Tokyo 
market is Asia’s largest money center.    TIBOR is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at 
which banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the Japan offshore market. The daily 
TIBOR data are available denominated in the Japanese yen and in the US dollar.    Although there is a 
partial overlap of reference banks between LIBOR and TIBOR, the reference banks in TIBOR are 
dominated by Japanese banks. 
The Japanese Bankers Association (JBA) has been publishing daily TIBOR denominated in 
the Japanese yen ("Japanese yen TIBOR") since November 1995 and "Euroyen TIBOR" since March 
1998.  The Japanese yen TIBOR reflects prevailing rates on the unsecured call market, while the 
Euroyen TIBOR reflects prevailing rates on the Japan offshore market. JBA calculates Euroyen 
TIBOR as a prevailing market rate based on quotes for 13 maturities (1 week, 1-12 months) provided 
by reference banks as of 11:00 a.m. each business day (Tokyo time).
4    The JBA excludes the top two 
and the two bottom reference rates for each maturity and takes the average of the remaining rates. 
These averages are published as the TIBOR rates (13 rates each for the Japanese yen and Euroyen) 
through information providers that have contracts with JBA.  The JBA does not publish a TIBOR 
rate denominated in the US dollar which we refer to “Eurodollar TIBOR”.  But Bloomberg and 
Nikkei Quick News Inc. collect the Eurodollar TIBOR data.  Bloomberg states that their Eurodollar 
TIBOR data are taken at the Tokyo close.  The data for Tokyo are downloaded from the Nikkei 
Financial QUEST database. 
 
                                                  
4  Reference banks in 2009 were Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Bank of Yokohama, Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Co., 
Deutsche Bank AG, JPMorgan Chase Bank, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation, Mizuho Bank, Mizuho 
Corporate Bank, Mizuho Trust and Banking Co., National Association, Norinchukin Bank, Resona Bank, Shinkin Central 
Bank, Shinsei Bank, Shoko Chukin Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., and 
UBS AG.    7 
3.  LIBOR and TIBOR in the 1990s and the 2000s 
Before exploring risk premiums during the global financial crisis, this section investigates 
the nature of the relationship between the daily offer rates for the 3-month TIBOR and the 3-month 
LIBOR throughout the 1990s and the 2000s.  The sample period is from 28 February 1991 to 30 
December 2009.    The period includes not only tranquil periods but also two turbulent periods, that is, 
the Japanese banking crisis and the global crisis periods. 
 
3.1.  Risk Premiums in the US Dollar 
This subsection explores the nature of the relationship between the daily offer rates for the 
3-month Eurodollar rates in the London and Tokyo markets: the US dollar-denominated TIBOR 
(Eurodollar TIBOR) and LIBOR (Eurodollar LIBOR).  In the data set used, the different trading 
times could be a source of deviation between the two series. But, to the extent that the effects of the 
time difference are negligible, the arbitrage condition suggests that the two series will show similar 
dynamics because both are denominated in the same currency.   
Table 1 summarizes annual average and annual standard deviations of Eurodollar spreads 
(that is, US-dollar-denominated TIBOR minus LIBOR) in each calendar year from 1991 to 2009.  
The annual average was positive throughout the sample period, but was below 0.1 points except for a 
few years and fell below 0.03 points from 2000 to 2007.  The correlation between LIBOR and 
TIBOR from 2000 to 2007 exceeded  0.99, suggesting that, despite the time difference between 
London and Tokyo, LIBOR and TIBOR are normally highly integrated. 
However, TIBOR became significantly higher than LIBOR during the period of the Japanese 
banking crisis.    The annual average spread exceeded 0.1 points from 1996 to 1999.    In particular, it 
exceeded 0.44 points in 1998, when the Japanese banking crisis became critical.  The difference 
between LIBOR and TIBOR, which is often referred to as the "Japan premium" in the literature, can 
be interpreted as representing the credit risk of Japanese banks at that time. 
    In Table 1, the annual average spread became close to 0.09 points in 2008 and exceeded 0.1    8 
points in 2009.    This implies that TIBOR became significantly higher than LIBOR during the global 
financial crisis.  Risk premiums in the Eurodollar markets boosted both LIBOR and TIBOR during 
the crisis, but the impacts were greater on TIBOR than on LIBOR.  In terms of credit risk, the 
impacts are paradoxical because the credit quality of European and US banks had been downgraded 
substantially while that of Japanese banks had not been downgraded under the global financial crisis.   
The result suggests that liquidity risk, rather than credit risk, might have been important in US dollar 
transactions under the crisis. 
 
3.2.    Risk Premiums in the Japanese Yen 
The last subsection investigated the relationship between the two daily offer rates for the 
3-month Eurodollar LIBOR and TIBOR.  This subsection explores the same relationship by using 
the daily offer rates for the 3-month yen-denominated rate in London (Euroyen LIBOR) and Tokyo 
(Euroyen TIBOR).
5    Except for the denomination currency, these rates are traded in the same manner 
as those used in the last subsection. To the extent that the choice of currency denomination does not 
change the risk characteristics, one can expect that the two series to show similar dynamics as those 
observed in the last section. 
Table 2 summarizes annual average and standard deviation of the yen-denominated spreads 
(Euroyen TIBOR minus Euroyen LIBOR).    As in the Eurodollar markets, the annual average became 
large during 1995--1999, especially in 1998, when the credit quality of Japanese banks deteriorated 
substantially.    But the deviation was smaller than that in the Eurodollar markets.  This  suggests  that 
the credit risk during the Japanese banking crisis was reflected less in the Euroyen TIBOR than in the 
Eurodollar TIBOR.  In general, Japanese banks can access various alternative sources for their 
yen-denominated borrowings but may not do so for their dollar-denominated borrowings.  During 
the crisis, this caused asymmetric increases in the observed risk premiums of Japanese banks in the 
                                                  
5  Two alternative rates are available for yen-denominated TIBOR.    In the following analysis, we use 
Euroyen TIBOR on the Japan offshore market.    But the essential results are the same even if we use 
Japanese Yen TIBOR on the unsecured call market.    9 
US dollar vis-à-vis in the Japanese yen.   
The Table shows that the annual average, when positive, was very small in nonfinancial crisis 
periods.  It showed modest deviation from zero during 2003–2005, when the Bank of Japan 
intensified its quantitative easing policy. The unconventional monetary policy distorted 
yen-denominated money markets but not dollar-denominated ones. The TIBOR–LIBOR spreads still 
remained small even in yen-denominated transactions in the first half of the 2000s.   
A more noteworthy result in the Table is that the annual average Euroyen TIBOR−LIBOR 
spreads became negative in 2007 and 2008.    This implies that, unlike in the Eurodollar markets, risk 
premiums raised LIBOR more than TIBOR in the Euroyen markets during the global financial crisis.   
Given that the credit quality of European and US banks declined substantially during the crisis but not 
that of Japanese banks, this is a natural consequence.  However, as shown in Figure 1, the risk 
premiums raised TIBOR more than LIBOR in the Eurodollar markets at the same time. This indicates 
that during the global financial crisis, the choice of the denomination currency dramatically changed 
how risk premiums were reflected in each interbank market.  The result suggests the importance of 
distinguishing not only between credit risk and liquidity risk but also between liquidity risks 
denominated in different currencies. 
   Figure 1 depicts the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads in both the Eurodollar and the Euroyen 
markets in the two crisis periods: that of the Japanese banking crisis (4 January 1995 to 30 December 
1999) and that of the global financial crisis (1 January 2007 to 30 December 2009).  During the 
Japanese banking crisis, the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads started to take positive values in the summer of 
1995 in both the Eurodollar and the Euroyen markets. The spreads became temporarily small from 
April 1996 to October 1997, then became very large after the collapse of major Japanese financial 
institutions in November 1997.    The spreads remained large through March 1999.    A key feature in 
this period is that the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads had very large positive values in both markets, 
although they were larger in the Eurodollar rate than in the Euroyen rate.  There is a strong 
co-movement of the spreads between the Eurodollar and Euroyen rates.    10 
In contrast, during the global financial crisis, the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads started to take 
opposite signs in the two markets. Before August 2007, the spreads were close to zero in both markets. 
But after August 2007, the spreads started to take positive values in the Eurodollar market and 
negative values in the Euroyen market.  Before the summer of 2008, the absolute values of the 
deviations were slightly larger in the Euroyen than in the Eurodollar market. Then, after September 
2008, they became larger in the Eurodollar than in the Euroyen market. The asymmetric impacts in 
the two markets are in marked contrast with what was observed during the Japanese banking crisis.  
The asymmetric deviations continue into the beginning of 2009. After January 2009, the 
TIBOR−LIBOR spreads started to take positive values in both markets. 
 
4. A  Model 
Ever since the turmoil began under the global financial crisis, several alternative 
explanations have been offered for the dramatic upward deviations of the money market rates from 
the corresponding risk free rates.  The most commonly mentioned explanations might be 
summarized into “counterparty credit risk” and “liquidity risk”.  But since our main interest is to 
compare interbank rates in different money markets and in different currency denominations, the 
following analysis assumes that these risks consist of both currency-specific and market-specific 
factors.    We denote the interbank money market rate denominated in currency h in market k in period 
t by i(h, k)t and decompose it as follows 
 
(1)  i(h, k)t = Rf(h)t + Risk(h, k)t + Liquidity(h, k)t, 
 
where h = US dollar or Japanese yen and k = Tokyo or London. 
In the right hand side of (1), Rf(h)t is risk-free rate denominated in currency h in period t.  
With the same terms to maturity, the risk-free rate captures the effect of expected future interest rate 
changes on i(h, k)t.  Expectations of future interest rate decline due to policy easing, for example,    11 
will cause the term interbank rate to decline through decreasing the risk-free rate with the same 
term-to-maturity.    Since the risk-free rate is not market-specific, Rf(h)t is independent of any specific 
factor in market k.   
Risk(h, k)t is a counterparty credit risk in currency h in market k in period t.  “Counterparty 
credit risk” means that banks became more reluctant to lend to other banks because of the perception 
that the risk of default on the loan had increased and/or the market price of taking on such risk had 
risen.  During the global financial crisis, the credit quality of European and US banks deteriorated 
substantially, but that of Japanese banks did not.  This suggests that the London market carried a 
larger counter-party credit risk than did the Tokyo market.  It is likely that Risk(h, k)t is sensitive to 
the specific factor in market k. 
Liquidity(h, k) t is a liquidity risk in currency h in market k in period t.  “Liquidity risk” 
means that traders at one bank are reluctant to expose the traders’ bank’s funds during a period of time 
where those funds might be needed to cover the bank’s own shortfalls.  In the financial turmoil, the 
trader may not be given as much “balance sheet” to invest, which is perceived as a shortage of 
liquidity to the trader.    In this situation, term loan markets come under stress, and term interest rates 
may be disconnected from overnight interest rates.  Because of the role of the US dollar as the 
international currency, the traders were especially sensitive to a liquidity shortage of the US dollar in 
international transactions.  It is likely that Liquidity(h, k) t is more conspicuous in the international 
transactions denominated in the US dollar. 
 
5.    “Counterparty Credit Risk” and “Liquidity Risk” 
To measure counterparty credit risk in Tokyo, London, and New York, the following analysis 
uses the credit default swap (CDS) prices of the banks in each country.    We use the daily time series 
of the 5 year financial service sector CDS index for Japan and the 5 year banks sector CDS indexes 
for the United Kingdom and the United States.  The data is based on CMA Data Vision which was 
downloaded from Datastream.    It is likely that the CDS index for each country reflects credit risk of    12 
the banks in the country.  We can therefore expect that the TIBOR - LIBOR spread is correlated 
positively with the CDS index for Japan and negatively with the CDS index for the UK.      In our data 
set, the CDS index for Japan, which covers not only banking sector but also the other financial sector, 
is more volatile than the indexes has several large upward spikes.  The following analysis thus used 
its logged value for the index for Japan.   
Unlike credit risk, it is difficult to measure liquidity risk directly.  But during the global 
financial crisis, the central banks made several attempts to improve liquidity premiums in money 
markets.  To the extent that the central bank has the ability to reduce the liquidity risk premium 
effectively, measuring the effects of these attempts is a crucial first step toward understanding the 
nature of the liquidity risk premium.    In the following analysis, we estimate the effects of the Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB)’s Foreign Exchange (FX) Swap Lines with the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the Bank 
of England (BOE), and European Central Bank (ECB).  For the FX Swap Lines with each central 
bank, we include a dummy variable which takes one on the dates for the operations and zero 
otherwise.    For the FX Swap Lines with BOJ, we also include a dummy which equals to the amount 
allocated on the dates for the operations and zero otherwise.  In addition, to capture the 
announcement effects of the FX Swap Lines, we include a dummy variable which takes one on the 
dates when FRB announced the swaps lines and zero otherwise. 
To measure the effects of the other central banks’ attempts to reduce liquidity risk premium, 
we include dummies for the FRB’s Term Auction Facility (TAF)
6 as well as the BOJ’s “outright 
purchases of CP” and “special funds-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing”.
7  T h e  
                                                  
6  Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the FRB auctions term funds to depository institutions in the 
United States. All depository institutions that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit program is 
eligible to participate in TAF auctions.    All advances must be fully collateralized.    Each TAF auction is 
for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate). 
7“Outright purchases of CP” is funds-supplying operations to purchase CP and ABCP that are deemed 
eligible as collateral by the BOJ and are a-1 rated, with a residual maturity of up to three months. The 
operations are conducted by a conventional auction with the minimum yields determined by the BOJ. 
“Special funds-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing” is funds-supplying operations by 
which the BOJ extends loans to its counterparties for an unlimited amount against the value of corporate 
debt submitted to the BOJ as collateral by them at an interest rate equivalent to the target for the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate.    13 
dummy variable for the BOJ’s “outright purchases of CP” which equals to the amount allocated on the 
dates for the operations and zero otherwise.  Each of the other dummy variable takes one on the 
dates when each operation took place and zero otherwise.  These facilities and the FX swaps could 
have different effects on the LIBOR and the TIBOR.  The swaps credit of the US dollar was 
available only to depositories outside the U.S. in the countries in which the central bank participated 
in the swaps program, while the TAF credit of the US dollar was only directly available to depository 
institutions in the U.S.  The BOJ’s “outright purchases of CP” and “special funds-supplying 
operations to facilitate corporate financing” increase availability of the Japanese yen only for financial 
institutions located in Japan.  Comparing the effects of these facilities, we can see the difference of 
the liquidity premiums across the markets and across the currency denominations. 
In addition to the above variables, we include both yen-denominated and dollar-denominated 
three-month overnight index swap (OIS) rate in the New York market, deviation from the covered 
interest parity (CIP) condition, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as 
auxiliary variables.
8  The inclusion of these auxiliary variables is to check the robustness of our 
estimation results.  Since OIS transactions contain little liquidity or credit risk premium, the OIS 
rates almost equal the average of the overnight interest rates expected until maturity.  Including the 
OIS rates may measure the effects of the expected future policy rates in Japan and in the United States.   
To calculate the deviation from the CIP condition of the yen-dollar exchange rates, we use the 
three-month OIS rates in Tokyo and New York markets as well as spot and three-month forward 
exchange rates.  The deviations allow us to calculate the risks which are specific in the foreign 
exchange market.   A large number of previous studies suggest substantial deviations from the CIP 
during the global financial crisis.  Including the deviation from the CIP may measure the effects 
discussed in these studies.  The VIX which was introduced by Whaley (1993) is a popular measure 
of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.  A high value corresponds to a more volatile 
                                                  
8  The data of the yen-denominated OIS was from the TOKYO TANSHI CO. LTD.    The other data series 
were downloaded from Datastream.    14 
market and therefore more costly options. Often referred to as the fear index, it represents one 
measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30 day period. 
 
6.   Econometric  Tests 
In the following sections, we endeavor to test how various factors—including the risk 
measures and liquidity measures —affect the TIBOR−LIBOR spread.    The dependent variable in the 
regression is either the three-month Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spread or the three-month Euroyen 
TIBOR−LIBOR spread.    For each dependent variable, we estimate the following equations: 
 
(2)  Eurodollar spreadt = constant + ∑h∑k Risk(h, k)t + ∑h∑k Liquidity(h, k)t, 
(3)  Euroyen spreadt = constant + ∑h∑k Risk(h, k)t + ∑h∑k Liquidity(h, k)t, 
 
where h = US dollar or Japanese yen and k = Tokyo, London, Europe, or New York.  For each 
equation, we also include the lagged values of the spreads, the lagged values of the first time 
difference of the spreads, and the auxiliary variables as explanatory variables.     
Equations (2) and (3) imply that each TIBOR−LIBOR spread is determined by several 
counter-party credit risks and liquidity risks in the two markets.  To the extent that the effect of the 
time difference is negligible, taking the difference between the interbank rates denominated in the 
same currency enables us to cleanse expectations effects that are reflected in the risk-free rate Rf(h)t.  
In each regression we use daily data during the sample period from January 4, 2007 through 
December 30, 2009, a span of time that includes both the market turmoil period and a comparable 
period of time before and after the turmoil.     
For equations (2) and (3), we perform our tests with OLS regressions and two extended 
GARCH models, that is, EGARCH and GJR-GARCH models.  The OLS regression is primitive in 
that it cannot capture notable asset price features such as dynamic volatility changes.  However, it 
provides a robust result that is less sensitive to a change of model specification.  In contrast, the    15 
EGARCH ( exponential general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) model proposed by 
Nelson (1991) allows the sign and the magnitude of the variance of the error term to have separate 
effects on the volatility.  The GJR-GARCH model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle 
(1993) allows threshold values of the variance of the error term.    The two GARCH models are useful 
when asset pricing prices have different volatilities depending upside and downside risks or when 
only large shocks attract investors' attention.     
Let ut denote the error term of the estimated equation and assume that ut =t t t h z .  Then, 
the variance equations of EGARCH(2,2) and GJR-GARCH(2, 2) are respectively represented as 
 
(4)  ln(ht) = c + f11⋅|zt-1| + f12⋅|zt-2| + f21⋅zt-1 + f22⋅zt-2 + f31⋅ln(ht-1) + f32⋅ln(ht-2), 




2⋅It-2 + g31⋅ht-1 + g32⋅ht-2, 
 
where It = 1 when ut-1 < 0 and 0 otherwise.  To the extent that either f11 or f12 in EGARCH and 
either g21 or g22 in GJR-GARCH are significantly different from zero, each GARCH model suggests 
that the variance equations have asymmetric dynamic process.  However, the estimation results of 
the models are sensitive to a change of model specification.    Therefore, we estimate GARCH(m, n) 
for 0 ≤ m ≤2 and 0 ≤ n ≤2 and report the result of GARCH(m, n) that had the highest log likelihood. 
 
7.  Estimated Results by OLS Regressions 
This section first reports the results of our tests with OLS regressions.  The results are 
summarized in Table 3 for the Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spread and Table 4 for the Euroyen 
TIBOR−LIBOR spread.  Both of the tables show the estimation results with and without the 
auxiliary variables.  In all cases, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test rejects serial 
correlations in the residuals.  Among the estimated coefficients, some of the auxiliary variables are 
significant.  In particular, deviation from the CIP conditions is significantly positive for the    16 
Eurodollar spread and significantly negative for the Euroyen spread.  However, regardless of the 
inclusion of the auxiliary variables, the effects of credit and liquidity risks are essentially the same.     
In all cases, both the CDS index for Japan and the CDS index for the UK enter with the 
correct sign and are highly significant.  Although the CDS index for the USA is insignificant, this 
implies that credit risk of Japanese banks increases TIBOR and that of UK banks increases LIBOR.  
Regardless of the denomination currency, the market-specific counterparty credit risks are the 
important determinants of the TIBOR – LIBOR spread.    During the global financial crisis, the credit 
quality of European banks declined substantially, but that of Japanese banks did not.  This suggests 
that LIBOR carried a larger counter-party credit risk than did TIBOR in both yen and dollar 
transactions. 
In contrast, most dummies of the FX Swap Lines are significant for the Eurodollar spread 
but not for the Euroyen spread.    The FX swap facilities are designed to improve liquidity conditions 
in global money markets by providing foreign central banks with the capacity to deliver U.S. dollar 
funding to institutions in their jurisdictions.  Using funds accessed through the swaps, the BOJ 
provided dollar liquidity to institutions in Japan and so did the BOE to institutions in the UK.     
For the Eurodollar spread, the dummy for the BOJ’s swap line is significantly negative 
especially when the amount allocated is used, while the dummy for the BOE’s swap line is 
significantly positive.  The opposite signs between these FX swap facilities indicate that the BOJ’s 
swap line was more effective in reducing US dollar liquidity risk in the Tokyo market and so was the 
BOE’s in the London market.    The significantly positive sign of the dummy for the FRB’s FX swap 
announcements, on the other hand, suggests that the FX swap facilities, on average, might have be 
more successful in reducing liquidity risk in London than in Tokyo.    With the auxiliary variables, the 
ECB’s swap line and the TAF credit have the same sign as the BOE’s but are statistically insignificant.     
For the Euroyen spread, the BOJ’s swap line is significantly negative when the amount 
allocated is used for the dummy.  The BOJ’s swap line might have been effective in reducing yen 
liquidity risk in the Tokyo market.  But the other dummy variables to measure liquidity risk are not    17 
significant for the Euroyen spread.    This is not only true for dummies of the FX Swap Lines and the 
TAF which provide dollar liquidity but also for dummies of BOJ’s “outright purchases of CP” and 
“special funds-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing” which provide yen liquidity.  
Regardless of the market location, yen-specific liquidity risk might not have been the important 
determinants of the TIBOR – LIBOR spreads during the global financial crisis.     
Because of the role of the US dollar as the international currency, the traders are especially 
sensitive to a liquidity shortage of the US dollar under the critical environments.    The shortage might 
have been more serious in Tokyo market than in London market because the latter is thicker than the 
former in terms of trading volume of the US dollar.   This may explain why TIBOR was higher than 
LIBOR denominated in the US dollar during the global financial crisis. 
 
8.  Estimated Results by EGARCH, and GJR-GARCH 
In this section, we examine how various factors affect the TIBOR−LIBOR spread by 
EGARCH and GJR-GARCH models.  The results with the auxiliary variables are summarized in 
Table 5 for the Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spread and Table 6 for the Euroyen TIBOR−LIBOR 
spread.  The GARCH models did not converge when we include all of the explanatory variables.  
We thus report the results excluding both Japanese bank’s stock excess returns and the ECB’s swap 
line dummy and including only one of the two BOJ’s swap line dummies, that is, the dummy for 
which the amount allocated is used.  EGARCH(1,1) and GJR-GARCH(1,0) had the highest log 
likelihood for the Eurodollar spread and so did EGARCH(1,2) and GJR-GARCH(1,2) for the Euroyen 
spread.  The Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spread showed no asymmetry in EGARCH.  However, in 
the other cases, the selected models suggest that the GARCH processes have not only significant 
persistence but also significant asymmetry. 
In the GARCH models, several auxiliary variables show signs and significance levels that 
are different from those in the OLS regressions.  For example, in Table 5, deviation from the CIP 
conditions, which was significantly positive in OLS, is still positive in GJR-GARCH but becomes    18 
significantly negative in EGARCH.  Dollar-denominated three-month OIS rate and VIX, both of 
which were not significant in the OLS regressions, become significantly positive in EGARCH and 
significantly negative in GJR-GARCH.     
However, in our GARCH models, the effects of credit risk on the TIBOR−LIBOR spread are 
essentially the same as what we observed in the OLS regressions.  In particular, the CDS index for 
Japan is significantly positive and the CDS index for the UK is significantly negative in all cases.  
Regardless of the denomination currency, credit risk of Japanese banks increases TIBOR and that of 
UK banks increases LIBOR.  Unlike in the OLS regressions, the CDS index for the USA becomes 
significant for the Eurodollar spread.  But its sign differs between EGARCH and GJR-GARCH, 
suggesting that its effects are not robust for the model specification.   
In our GARCH models, the effects of liquidity risk on the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads are also 
very similar to what we observed in the OLS regressions.    For the Eurodollar spread, the BOJ’s swap 
line is significantly negative and the BOE’s swap line is significantly positive in both EGARCH and 
GJR-GARCH.    This indicates that in reducing dollar liquidity risk, the BOJ’s swap line was effective 
in the Tokyo market and so was the BOE’s in the London market.  For the Eurodollar spread, both 
the FRB’s swap announcement and the FRB’s TAF are also significantly positive in both EGARCH 
and GJR-GARCH.    This is in contrast with the results of our OLS regressions where the FRB’s TAF 
was not significant.    Our GRACH models suggest that not only the FRB’s FX swap facilities but also 
the FRB’s TAF might have be more successful in reducing US dollar liquidity risk in London than in 
Tokyo. 
For the Euroyen spread, the FRB’s FX swap announcement is significantly positive in both 
EGARCH and GJR-GARCH.  This is in contrast with what we observed in the OLS regressions.  
However, the other dummy variables to measure liquidity risk are not significant except in almost all 
cases.   Even the BOJ’s swap line, which was significantly negative in our OLS regressions, is no 
longer significant in the GARCH models.  This implies that the effect of BOJ’s swap lines in the 
OLS regressions is not robust.  Our GARCH models more strongly support the view that    19 
yen-specific liquidity risk might not have been the important determinants of the Euroyen TIBOR – 
LIBOR spread during the global financial crisis.     
 
9.  Results under Shorter or Longer Terms to Maturity 
Until the last section, we have investigated the degree of synchronization between TIBOR 
and LIBOR by using the three-month interbank rates.  The use of the three-month rates is desirable 
in that three-month is most widely transacted term to maturity in the money markets.  However, the 
terms-to-maturity transacted in the international interbank markets vary from 1 week to 12 months.  
It thus deserves to see to what extent our main results hold when we use the rates that have shorter or 
longer terms to maturity.  This section explores this by using the one-month and the twelve-month 
interbank offered rates.   
For the one-month and the twelve-month rates, Figures 2 depicts the TIBOR−LIBOR 
spreads in the Eurodollar and the Euroyen markets from 1 January 2007 to 30 December 2009.  As 
we found for the three-month interbank rates, the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads in the two markets show 
opposite signs during the global financial crisis.    Regardless of the term to maturity, the spreads took 
positive values in the Eurodollar market and negative values in the Euroyen market after the crisis 
broke out.   
However, the amplitude of the spreads is very different depending on how long the term to 
maturity is.  The absolute values of the Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spreads became larger as the 
term-to-maturity is shorter.  The spreads frequently became greater than 0.2 points and sometimes 
exceeded 0.4 for the one-month rate, while they rarely exceeded 0.1 points for the twelve-month rate.   
In contrast, the absolute values of Euroyen TIBOR−LIBOR spreads became larger as the 
term-to-maturity is longer.  The spreads fell below -0.1 points after August in 2007 and became 
lower than -0.3 points in October 2008 for the twelve-month rate, while they usually lied between 0 
and -0.1 points and rarely fell below -0.2 for the one-month rate.  In addition, the spreads remained 
negative even in 2009 for the twelve-month rate, while they turned to be positive in 2009.  The    20 
difference probably suggests that US dollar liquidity risk is higher when transacting in shorter time 
horizon and that credit risk is larger when transacting in longer time horizon. 
Using these spreads as dependent variables, we estimate our basic equations (2) and (3) by 
OLS regressions.    The results are summarized in Table 7 for the Eurodollar TIBOR−LIBOR spreads 
and  Table 8 for the Euroyen TIBOR−LIBOR spreads.  They are the results excluding Japanese 
bank’s stock excess returns and including only one of the two BOJ’s swap line dummies, that is, the 
dummy for which the amount allocated is used.  Compared with the results in section 7, some of 
them are slightly sensitive to the model specification.  This may happen because transactions of 
one-month and twelve-month rates are not as thick as those of three-month rates.  The tables report 
the estimation results without the auxiliary variables.    But we include an auxiliary variable when the 
estimated coefficients are unstable for a small change of specification or when we cannot reject serial 
correlations.
9 
In both tables, the effects of credit risk on the TIBOR−LIBOR spreads are essentially the 
same as what we observed for the three-month rates.  In particular, the CDS index for Japan is 
positive and the CDS index for the UK is negative in all cases, although the UK CDS index was 
insignificant for the twelve-month Eurodollar spreads.  Regardless of the denomination currency, 
credit risk of Japanese banks increases TIBOR and that of UK banks increases LIBOR.     
In both tables, the effects of liquidity risk on the spreads are also similar to what we 
observed for the three-month rates.  For the Eurodollar spreads, the BOJ’s swap line is significantly 
negative and the BOE’s swap line is significantly positive for both the one-month and the 
twelve-month rates.    This indicates that in reducing US dollar liquidity risk, the BOJ’s swap line was 
effective in the Tokyo market and so was the BOE’s in the London market.    It also suggests that not 
only the FRB’s FX swap facilities but also the ECB’s swap line might have be more successful in 
                                                  
9 For example, since one-month Eurodollar spread had an upward spike on September 19, 
2008, we include a dummy for it to remove the effect of the outlier. 
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reducing US dollar liquidity risk in London than in Tokyo.  For the Euroyen spreads, the results are 
the same as what we obtained by OLS regressions for the three-month rates.    The BOJ’s swap line is 
significantly negative.  But the other dummy variables to measure liquidity risk are not significant 
for the Euroyen spreads.  Regardless of the market location, yen-specific liquidity risk might not 
have been the important determinants of the TIBOR – LIBOR spreads during the global financial 
crisis. 
 
10.   Concluding  Remarks 
Financial crisis increases risk premiums in national and regional financial markets. This paper 
explored how international money markets reflected such risk premiums during the global financial 
crisis. Unlike medium- or long-term financial markets such as bond markets and stock markets, 
money markets play an important role in providing liquidity. Therefore, not only credit risk but also 
liquidity risk were important in the money markets during the global financial crisis. 
After matching the currency denomination, how TIBOR has been synchronized with LIBOR 
was investigated.    Our noteworthy finding is the remarkably asymmetric responses in how the Tokyo 
market reflected both credit and liquidity risk premiums during the global financial crisis.  We find 
that the asymmetric impacts in the dollar-denominated and yen-denominated markets had a “home 
bias,” reflecting different liquidity premiums during the financial crisis. 
   The regression results suggested that credit risk explains the difference across the markets, 
while liquidity risk explains the difference across the currency denominations.  They also 
indicated the importance of US dollar liquidity provisions during the global financial crisis.    During 
the global financial crisis, risk premiums in the US dollar transactions were driven not only by 
counter-party risk but also by factors related to funding liquidity.  In particular, pressure in the 
interbank market made it critical for non-US banks to retain access to other sources of dollar funding.   
This suggests the importance of distinguishing not only between credit risk and liquidity risk but also 
between liquidity risks denominated in different currencies.      22 
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Table 1. The Spreads between the LIBOR and the TIBOR in the US dollar 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
average 0.050 0.069 0.036 0.017 0.084 0.100 0.164
S.D. 0.036 0.041 0.050 0.033 0.110 0.041 0.219
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
average 0.442 0.098 0.007 0.011 0.028 0.029 0.008
S.D. 0.201 0.139 0.011 0.029 0.024 0.011 0.009
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
average 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.090 0.112




Table 2. The Spreads between the LIBOR and the TIBOR in the Japanese Yen 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
average 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.039 0.059 0.060
S.D. 0.038 0.031 0.024 0.020 0.063 0.025 0.076
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
average 0.168 0.057 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.029 0.034
S.D. 0.104 0.078 0.012 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.008
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
average 0.032 0.008 -0.062 -0.097 0.069
S.D. 0.012 0.020 0.057 0.171 0.045  
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Table 3. Determinants of Eurodollar TIBOR - LIBOR Spreads: OLS Regressions 
 
    Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic
Constant  -0.0091  -0.288  -0.0054  -0.169  -0.0851  -6.569 
Dollar SPR(-1)  0.4799  14.838  0.4614  14.419  0.6306  22.030 
Yen SPR(-1)  0.0579  1.590  0.0643  1.759  -0.1109  -4.524 
dDollarSPR(-1)  0.2458  7.292  0.2581  7.662  0.1622  4.774 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.0562  0.397  0.0187  0.132  -0.0158  -0.108 
CDS(Japan)  0.0102  2.101  0.0101  2.075  0.0228  6.910 
CDS(UK)  -0.0002  -2.634  -0.0002  -2.660  -0.0002  -2.777 
CD(USA)  0.0000  -0.843  0.0000  -0.911  0.0000  -0.286 
SWAPD(BOJ)  -0.0016  -0.178  -0.0185  -2.590  -0.0066  -0.712 
SWAPA(BOJ)  -0.0016  -3.137        -0.0017  -3.202 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0119  2.255  0.0129  2.424  0.0249  4.696 
SWAPD(ECB)  0.0108  1.026  0.0016  0.156  -0.0010  -0.097 
FRBSWAP  0.2294  8.269  0.2273  8.146  0.2960  10.617 
TAFUSA  0.0022  0.416  0.0019  0.366  0.0007  0.134 
BOJ(Corporate)  0.0024  0.411  0.0009  0.160  0.0005  0.077 
BOJ(CP)  0.0013  0.260  0.0007  0.138  0.0013  0.238 
VIX  0.0002  0.940  0.0002  1.006       
CIP  0.0408  8.102  0.0409  8.085       
OISYEN  -0.0247  -1.156  -0.0269  -1.250       
OISDOLLAR  -0.0011  -0.410  -0.0015  -0.538       
Adj. R-squared  0.805      0.803      0.784     
LM Test  35.897      32.913      59.156     
 
Notes 
1)  Dollar SPR = Eurodollar TIBOR – LIBOR, Yen SPR = Euroyen TIBOR – LIBOR, 
2)  CDS(Japan), CDS(UK),  and  CDS(US)  =  5  year  CDS  index  for  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and the United States respectively. 
3)  SWAP(BOJ) and SWAP(BOE) = dummy that takes one when dollar liquidity was provided by 
BOJ and BOE respectively.  FRBSWAP = dummy that takes one when FRB announced the 
swaps lines. 
4)  TAF = dummy that takes one the dates of TAF operation, BOJ(CP) and BOJ(Corporate) = dummy 
that takes one on the dates of BOJ’s “outright purchases of CP” and “special funds-supplying 
operations to facilitate corporate financing” respectively. 
5)  LM test shows F-values based on Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Euroyen TIBOR - LIBOR Spreads: OLS Regressions 
 
    Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic
Constant  -0.0011  -0.133  -0.0003  -0.040  -0.0139  -4.187 
Yen SPR(-1)  0.9426  97.317  0.9440  97.257  0.9749  154.711 
Dollar SPR(-1)  0.0158  1.836  0.0119  1.404  -0.0037  -0.497 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.0531  1.411  0.0452  1.202  0.0684  1.811 
dDollarSPR(-1)  0.0041  0.462  0.0067  0.753  0.0141  1.612 
CDS(Japan)  0.0031  2.413  0.0031  2.393  0.0037  4.327 
CDS(UK)  -0.0001  -4.098  -0.0001  -4.116  -0.0001  -3.223 
CD(USA)  0.0000  0.885  0.0000  0.824  0.0000  -0.268 
SWAPD(BOJ)  0.0016  0.671  -0.0020  -1.033  0.0026  1.083 
SWAPA(BOJ)  -0.0003  -2.475        -0.0003  -2.530 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0006  0.442  0.0008  0.583  -0.0007  -0.544 
SWAPD(ECB)  -0.0033  -1.178  -0.0052  -1.939  -0.0004  -0.148 
FRBSWAP  0.0111  1.499  0.0106  1.436  0.0013  0.184 
TAFUSA  -0.0014  -1.007  -0.0014  -1.040  -0.0011  -0.786 
BOJ(Corporate)  0.0007  0.453  0.0004  0.255  0.0012  0.769 
BOJ(CP)  -0.0001  -0.038  -0.0002  -0.133  0.0002  0.141 
VIX  -0.0001  -1.390  -0.0001  -1.328       
CIP  -0.0040  -2.998  -0.0040  -2.961       
OISYEN  -0.0162  -2.843  -0.0166  -2.913       
OISDOLLAR  -0.0005  -0.665  -0.0006  -0.767       
Adj. R-squared  0.991      0.991      0.991     




1)    The dentitions of the explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 3. 
2)  LM test shows F-values based on Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test.    27 
Table 5. Determinants of Eurodollar TIBOR - LIBOR Spreads: GARCH models 
 
  EGARCH      GJR-GARCH 
    Coefficient  Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic
Constant  0.0173  0.958  -0.0263  -8.045 
Dollar SPR(-1)  0.5578  55.646  0.9148  241.341 
Yen SPR(-1)  0.0916  8.329  0.0200  5.778 
dDollarSPR(-1)  -0.3827  -47.701  0.0205  2.468 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.2047  4.866  0.0059  0.384 
CDS(Japan)  0.0084  2.574  0.0046  9.416 
CDS(UK)  -0.0004  -12.961  -0.0001  -11.454 
CD(USA)  0.0001  4.112  0.0000  -4.270 
SWAPA(BOJ)  -0.0008  -8.178  -0.0019  -14.610 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0051  2.123  0.0036  8.069 
FRBSWAP  0.6205  139.527  0.4962  6.037 
TAFUSA  0.0050  2.607  0.0040  5.116 
BOJ(Corporate)  -0.0040  -1.539  0.0003  0.432 
BOJ(CP)  0.0078  1.244  -0.0027  -2.268 
VIX  0.0004  4.369  0.0003  15.893 
CIP  -0.0138  -10.243  0.0129  19.187 
OISYEN  0.0042  0.538  -0.0024  -0.940 
OISDOLLAR  -0.0086  -6.374  0.0018  10.248 
C  -8.3590  -72.864  0.0000  12.145 
f(21)  1.1459  52.320         
f(31)  -0.1255  -6.916         
g(11)        4.1610  11.796 
g(31)          -1.3852  -2.494 
Adj. R-squared  0.549      0.731     
 
Notes 
1)   Except for the variance equation, the dentitions of the explanatory variables are the same as 
those in Table 3. 
2)  The parameters in the variance equations are those of the equations: ln(ht) = c + f21⋅zt-1 + f31⋅ln(ht-1) 
and ht = c + g11⋅ut-1
2 + g21⋅ut-1
2⋅It-1.    28 
Table 6. Determinants of Euroyen TIBOR - LIBOR Spreads: GARCH models 
  EGARCH      GJR-GARCH 
    Coefficient  Z-Statistic Coefficient Z-Statistic
Constant  -0.0035  -1.399  0.0037  1.310 
Yen SPR(-1)  0.9783  238.561  0.9472  238.637 
Dollar SPR(-1)  0.0096  2.543  0.0176  3.854 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.2244  4.489  0.1122  2.071 
dDollarSPR(-1)  0.0099  2.806  0.0100  2.296 
CDS(Japan)  0.0014  3.436  0.0020  5.142 
CDS(UK)  0.0000  -3.838  0.0000  -6.677 
CD(USA)  0.0000  -0.148  0.0000  1.261 
SWAPA(BOJ)  0.0000  -0.432  0.0001  1.095 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0003  0.447  -0.0004  -0.620 
FRBSWAP  0.0152  7.230  0.0186  4.885 
TAFUSA  0.0002  0.381  -0.0003  -0.408 
BOJ(Corporate)  0.0005  1.082  0.0004  0.653 
BOJ(CP)  0.0000  -0.008  0.0000  -0.050 
VIX  0.0000  0.865  -0.0001  -5.235 
CIP  -0.0037  -4.857  -0.0035  -5.034 
OISYEN  -0.0003  -0.184  -0.0234  -13.720 
OISDOLLAR  -0.0005  -1.750  0.0006  2.167 
constant  -0.6281  -8.882  0.0000  4.229 
f(11)  0.6325  28.159       
f(21)  -0.0361  -1.872       
f(31)  0.3725  14.981       
f(32)  0.6083  23.502       
g(11)        0.5957  9.755 
g(21)        0.2676  2.813 
g(31)        0.3682  5.147 
g(32)          0.1472  2.668 
Adj. R-squared  0.991      0.991     
 
Notes 
1)  Except for the variance equation, the dentitions of the explanatory variables are the same as those 
in Table 3. 
2)  The parameters in the variance equations are those of the equations: ln(ht) = c + f11⋅|zt-1| + f21⋅zt-1 + 
f31⋅ln(ht-1) + f32⋅ln(ht-2) and ht = c + g11⋅ut-1
2 + g21⋅ut-1
2⋅It-1 + g31⋅ht-1 + g32⋅ht-2.    29 
Table 7.    Determinants of Eurodollar Spreads under Different Terms to Maturity 
  one month rates  twelve month rates 
    Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant  -0.1044  -8.992  -0.0269  -2.2006 
Dollar SPR(-1)  0.4978  20.169  0.5396  14.1185 
Yen SPR(-1)  -0.2080  -8.353  0.0637  1.4356 
dDollarSPR(-1)  -0.0066  -0.201  -0.1221  -3.3039 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.1322  1.280  0.1113  0.7460 
3M Yen S(-1)          -0.1179  -3.1847 
CDS(Japan)  0.0261  8.817  0.0081  2.3765 
CDS(UK)  -0.0002  -1.939  0.0000  -0.3019 
CD(USA)  0.0001  3.330  0.0000  -0.5633 
SWAPA(BOJ)  -0.0020  -4.007  -0.0010  -2.8080 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0122  2.018  0.0128  3.2413 
SWAPD(ECB)  0.0198  1.657  0.0272  3.3038 
FRBSWAP  0.4882  14.583  0.0796  3.5036 
TAFUSA  -0.0013  -0.198  0.0055  1.2488 
BOJ(Corporate)  0.0033  0.452  0.0052  1.0523 
BOJ(CP)  -0.0024  -0.384  0.0012  0.2730 
Dummy  0.8776  15.586       
Adj. R-squared  0.819      0.409     
LM Test  12.871      9.889    
 
Notes 
1)  3M Yen S = three-month Euroyen TIBOR – LIBOR, and Dummy = dummy that takes one on 
September 19, 2008 and zero otherwise. 
2)  The dentitions of the other explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 3. 
3)  LM test shows F-values based on Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. 
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Table 8. Determinants of Euroyen Spreads under Different Terms to Maturity 
  one month rates  twelve month rates 
    Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant  -0.0263  -5.643  -0.0059  -3.4435 
Yen SPR(-1)  0.9015  65.579  0.9844  164.6062 
Dollar SPR(-1)  -0.0210  -1.061  0.0055  0.6714 
dYenSPR(-1)  0.0678  1.814  0.0397  2.2593 
dDollarSPR(-1)  0.0049  0.465  0.0015  0.3377 
3M Dollar S(-1)  0.0270  1.788       
CDS(Japan)  0.0062  5.216  0.0015  3.2670 
CDS(UK)  -0.0001  -2.871  0.0000  -2.9975 
CD(USA)  0.0000  2.758  0.0000  -0.1530 
SWAPA(BOJ)  -0.0005  -2.730  -0.0002  -2.6988 
SWAPD(BOE)  0.0004  0.176  -0.0001  -0.0542 
SWAPD(ECB)  -0.0072  -1.617  0.0011 0.5597 
FRBSWAP  -0.0086  -0.675  -0.0022  -0.3868 
TAFUSA  -0.0041  -1.733  -0.0003  -0.2338 
BOJ(Corporate)  0.0009  0.359  0.0006  0.5164 
BOJ(CP)  -0.0005  -0.210  0.0009  0.8671 
CIP  -0.0130  -5.539       
Adj. R-squared  0.968      0.987     
LM Test  1.336      18.304     
 
Notes 
1)  3M Dollar S = three-month Eurodollar TIBOR – LIBOR. 
2)  The dentitions of the other explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 3. 
3)  LM test shows F-values based on Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. 
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Figure 1. The TIBOR − LIBOR spreads in the Eurodollar and the Euroyen 
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Figure 2. The Spreads under Shorter or Longer Terms-to-Maturity 
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